In the recent case of Rees v Earl of Plymouth [2020] the Court of Appeal clarified the scope of the landlord’s right of access “for all reasonable purposes” following a dispute relating to the landlord’s development proposals of an agricultural holding. 

The case concerned a 240 acre holding in South Wales, farmed by the tenant under two tenancy agreements protected by the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986. The landlord (and appellant to the proceedings) had permission to develop the land into a large scale housing development, and it was a condition of that permission for the landlord to undertake various environmental surveys and associated works on the farm. This included digging trial pits and boreholes (which had already been undertaken with the agreement of the tenant, who had been compensated), staking out the gas pipeline, leaving remote bat detectors on the land for several days and a carrying out an ecological survey (with the latter being refused by the tenant, which led to the dispute). The extent of these investigations brought into question whether the landlord’s contractual right of access was wide enough to cover entry onto the holding for these purposes.  


The tenancy agreements contained different rights of entry, with the first allowing access “…at all reasonable times and for all reasonable purposes”, and the second “… for the purpose of inspecting the same”. One agreement contained an express covenant for quiet enjoyment (which was implied into the other), and both required the landlord not to interfere with the tenant’s use of the land. 


At first instance, the judge ruled predominately in favour of the tenant, and held that the rights of entry did not entitle the landlord to dig excavations or sink boreholes on the holding, but it did entitle it to install remote bat monitors on the holding, as this fell within its reserved right of access and inspection. 


The tenant appealed and relied on previous case law whereby the landlord’s right of access had been construed narrowly, so as not to interfere with the tenant’s right to enjoy the land. 


In handing down judgment, Lord Justice Lewison made the following key points:


1.      “Reasonable purposes” were reasonable purposes concerned with the parties’ rights and obligations, including purposes concerned with the landlords’ reversionary interest in the farm. This would entitle the landlord to do what is “reasonably necessary” to achieve that purpose, but not what is reasonably convenient or desirable. 


2.      Rights excepted and reserved by a landlord should be interpreted subject to the usual rules of contractual interpretation, and highlighted that what would be permitted by a right of entry will be a question of fact and degree in the context of each case. In this case, the nature and extent of the holding was clearly relevant in determining whether the investigations the landlord intended to undertake were intrusive, or would cause material disturbance.


3.      The rights should be construed so as to avoid a derogation from grant or breach of the landlord’s quiet enjoyment covenant, but the former would only be triggered if the landlord’s activities would result in substantial or serious interference with the tenant’s use and enjoyment of the land – it does not mean that the right of entry should be given the narrowest possible interpretation. 


With landlords of agricultural land increasingly considering its development prospects and the extent of the investigations they are able to carry out whilst a tenancy is continuing, this decision will be welcomed. This case indicates that the Courts are willing to adopt a broad interpretation of rights of access and whilst it does not provide a set of rules in terms of what is and is not permitted under a right of access, it does confirm that each case will turn on its facts.